














































ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES
Gian Carlo Scarsi and Gregory Smith
DIFFERENT APPROACHES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR 




ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES
Florence School of Regulation 
 
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE 
ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES 
FLORENCE SCHOOL OF REGULATION
Different approaches and responsibilities for investment sustainability in EU 
railway infrastructure: 
four case studies 
GIAN CARLO SCARSI AND GREGORY SMITH
EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2010/88 
 
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other 
purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s).  
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 





© 2010 Gian Carlo Scarsi and Gregory Smith 
Printed in Italy, November 2010 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 







Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), directed by Stefano Bartolini since 
September 2006, is home to a large post-doctoral programme. Created in 1992, it aims to develop 
inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to promote work on the major issues facing the 
process of integration and European society. 
The Centre hosts major research programmes and projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc 
initiatives. The research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, 
reflecting the changing agenda of European integration and the expanding membership of the 
European Union.  
Details of this and the other research of the Centre can be found on:   
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/ 
Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Distinguished Lectures and 
books. Most of these are also available on the RSCAS website:   
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s).  
Florence School of Regulation 
The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) is a partnership between the Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies (RSCAS) at the European University Institute (EUI), the Council of the European 
Energy Regulators (CEER) and the Independent Regulators Group (IRG). Moreover, as part of the 
EUI, the FSR works closely with the European Commission. 
The objectives of the FSR are to promote informed discussions on key policy issues, through 
workshops and seminars, to provide state-of-the-art training for practitioners (from European 
Commission, National Regulators and private companies), to produce analytical and empirical 
researches about regulated sectors, to network, and to exchange documents and ideas. 
At present, its scope is focused on the regulation of Energy (electricity and gas markets), of 
Communications & Media, and of Transport. 
This series of working papers aims at disseminating the work of scholars and practitioners on current 
regulatory issues. 
 
For further information 
Florence School of Regulation 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
European University Institute 
Via Boccaccio, 151 
I-50133 Firenze 
Tel.: +39 055 4685 751 





This paper describes the approach to investment in rail infrastructure in four different European 
countries (Great Britain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands) with a view to understanding whether 
and how these countries differ in their approach to the sustainability of investment in infrastructure. 
We compare and contrast different approaches to investment, such as: The direct role of government; 
The role of the economic regulator, where available; The influence of particular ownership 
agreements, such as the use of concessions for high-speed lines; Any differential treatment of different 
assets, and any differential treatment of different items of expenditure, such as maintenance, renewals, 
and enhancements; The role played by private capital (in infrastructure as separate from passenger and 
freight train operations); and The existence of a (more or less unlimited), either direct or indirect, state 
guarantee on debt issued to fund investment in network assets. In analysing the European case studies, 
the paper asks the following questions, which may differ across infrastructure categories (for instance 
track/signalling, stations, and high-speed lines): (i) What is the ownership structure of each IM? (ii) 
Who “sponsors” and specifies investment? (iii) Who is responsible for planning and approving 
investment? (iv) What are the ultimate funding sources of investment? (v) Who is responsible for 
delivering investment? (vi) What is the role of the independent economic and technical regulator 
(where availble) vis-à-vis the government? (vii) Is there any (direct or indirect) market mechanism, for 
instance as part of incentive regulation, that is mimicked when incentivising the monopoly provider of 
infrastructure to achieve a sustainable level of investment? The paper concludes with some policy 
considerations and recommendations based on the four case studies examined. 
Keywords 





1 describes the approach to investment in rail infrastructure in four European countries 
(Great Britain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands) with a view to understanding whether and how 
these countries differ in their approach to the sustainability of investment. 
We compare and contrast different approaches to investment, such as: 
•  The direct role of government; 
•  The role of the economic regulator, where present; 
•  The influence of particular ownership agreements, such as the use of concessions for high-speed 
networks; 
•  Any differential treatment of assets and items of expenditure, such as maintenance, renewals, 
and enhancements; 
•  The role played by private capital (in infrastructure as separate from passenger and freight train 
operations); and 
•  The existence of a (more or less unlimited), either direct or indirect, state guarantee on debt 
issued to fund investment in network assets. 
When analysing the four European case studies, we ask the following questions, which may differ 
across infrastructure categories (for instance track/signalling, structures, stations, and high-speed 
lines): 
(a) What is the ownership structure of each Infrastructure Manager (IM)? 
(b) Who “sponsors” and specifies investment? 
(c) Who is responsible for planning and approving investment? 
(d) What are the ultimate funding sources of investment? And 
(e) Who is responsible for delivering investment? 
After the illustration of the case studies, the paper concludes with some policy considerations.  
2. Great Britain 
In Great Britain
2 (GB), the railway sector was privatised in 1994 and split into an IM (Railtrack, 
subsequently Network Rail since 2002), a number of franchised Train Operating Companies
3 (TOCs), 
Freight Operating Companies (FOCs), companies leasing rolling stock to the former (known under the 
                                                      
*  The views expressed by the authors of this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the Office of Rail Regulation. The 
paper is delivered in a personal capacity. 
1  We would like to thank Garry White and David Smallbone (Network Rail and AMCL, respectively, London), Bastian 
Klammer and Wolfgang Krick (Bundesnetzagentur, Bonn), Claudine Vliegen (NMa, Den Haag), Benjamin Guedou 
(RFF, Paris), and our ORR colleagues Paul McMahon, Brian Kogan, Agnès Bonnet, and Tony Doyle for providing 
helpful information and comments on earlier versions of this paper. Nonetheless, any remaining errors or inaccuracies 
remain our own. 
2  We concentrate on Great Britain (England, Wales, and Scotland) as a subset of the UK (which also includes Northern 
Ireland) because the most interesting arrangements for this specific paper are those made in Great Britain, where railways 
are vertically de-integrated and an economic and quality/safety regulator is active. 
3  TOCs operate under franchise agreements with the government through the UK Department for Transport in England and 
Wales, and Transport Scotland (under devolution) in Scotland. Gian Carlo Scarsi and Gregory Smith 
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acronym of ROSCOs) and – more recently – open access operators in the passenger sector
4. Since 
2007, GB has had a dedicated high-speed line along the London-Folkestone (Kent) corridor, 
physically separate from the traditional network, which is owned by government
5 and let under a long-
term concession agreement to a company called High Speed 1 (HS1). The concessionary company is 
being sold by the government in 2010, but the concession itself (or rather, the company owning the 
right to transfer or revoke it) will be kept under public control. A second high-speed line, serving the 
domestic market along the West Coast corridor from London to Birmingham/Manchester and 
eventually Scotland, is currently planned under the name of High Speed 2 (HS2), with a provisional 
completion time horizon of 2025. 
In GB there is an economic, technical, and safety regulator, the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR). 
ORR regulates both traditional and high-speed networks. Differently from some if not most UK 
network regulators (for instance, in utility sectors
6), ORR plays an active role in the setting of network 
access charges as opposed to simply approving the methodology and calculation of charges by the 
industry. ORR sets revenue requirements for Network Rail (NR), the IM
7 for conventional networks, 
and has recently started regulating HS1 (October 2009) along similar lines. Revenue requirements are 
determined according to the traditional UK method of “building blocks” regulation, although in the 
railway industry the building blocks tend to differ from those in the utility sectors because of different 
traditions in the categorisation of cost items. 
In traditional utilities such as energy and water, the building blocks for a network operator would 
typically be operating expenditure
8 (opex), capital expenditure (capex), and an appropriate rate of 
return on the Regulated Asset Base (RAB). In railways, the cost categories of an IM are typically 
made up of operating cost, maintenance cost, renewals cost, and cost related to enhancements of the 
network or other assets pertaining to the railway. This different categorisation has important 
implications for the way in which both the government and the economic regulator structure the 
funding and regulation of the IM. Although there is no ring-fencing of individual cost categories, both 
the government (Department for Transport) and regulator (ORR) tend to view funding and efficiency 
issues at least partially as a function of the different taxonomy of cost and asset categories that is 
typical of railway infrastructure. 
2.1 Infrastructure ownership and funding of main lines 
NR owns mainline infrastructure in GB, with the exception of HS1, whose assets are owned directly 
by the government through the Secretary of State. 
NR itself is not owned directly by government, but is partly funded and (with respect to debt) 
“guaranteed” by it through a relatively uncommon corporate structure known as “Company Limited 
by Guarantee” (CLG). The CLG is an alternative type of corporation used primarily for non-dividend 
organisations that require legal personality. NR does not have a share capital or shareholders, but 
instead has “members” who formally guarantee it by undertaking to contribute a nominal amount in 
the event of the winding up of the company. In practice, the real guarantee is provided by government 
through debt. NR’s debt – albeit separate from pure and simple government debt – carries the backing 
of the UK government in exchange for a nominal fee. This particular arrangement puts NR in a 
                                                      
4  All FOCs are treated as open access operators, i.e. they are not franchised by government. 
5  Under the name of London and Continental Railways (LCR). 
6  For instance, the electricity and gas transmission/distribution sectors. 
7  Network Rail is prevented by its licence from having any interest in the operation of trains, apart from infrastructure 
maintenance and inspection trains. 
8  Depending on regulatory accounting conventions, the yearly rate of asset depreciation – which is also part of the building 
blocks – is either included in regulatory opex or kept as a separate category. Different approaches and responsibilities for investment sustainability in EU railway infrastructure: four case studies 
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somewhat undefined position that is, according to some independent bodies reporting to UK 
Parliament such as the National Audit Office (NAO), only formally different from that of full state 
ownership. In addition to the financial guarantee, the government also provides NR with a direct grant 
to complement NR’s track access income. At the time of the last regulatory price control decision (late 
2008), NR had been given, since company inception, £16.4bn
9 (€19.7bn) worth of Government grants 
to supplement £6.2bn (€7.4bn) in regulated track and station access charges
10 paid by train operators 
using the network. In addition, NR issues debt on the open market under government support. Its level 
of debt has recently (June 2010) been reported as being in the neighbourhood of £23.8bn (€28.6bn)
11. 
2.2 Infrastructure management and sustainability (main lines) 
NR is entirely responsible for managing main line infrastructure in GB. It is also responsible for the 
sustainability of investment over time, within the funding constraints set by government and the caps 
imposed by ORR on the revenue requirement from track access charges (taking into account efficiency 
targets over each 5-year price control period). However, the government takes responsibility for 
making sure that investment outputs are set at a level which is compatible with the public funds 
available to the railway sector at each five-year interval. It does so through the High Level Output 
Specification (HLOS) coupled with a Statement of Funds Available (SoFA)
12, which is the input 
available to meet HLOS requirements.  
These documents are intended to ensure that the railway industry has clear and timely information 
about the strategic outputs that governments in England/Wales and Scotland want the railway to 
deliver with the public funds (grants) they are prepared to make available. ORR determines the outputs 
that NR in particular, as the monopolistic provider of main line infrastructure in GB, must deliver to 
achieve the HLOS, the cost of delivering such outputs in the most efficient way (revenue 
requirements), and the implications for the track access charges payable by train operators to NR for 
using the main line network.  
Because of the above arrangements, there are three parties responsible in GB for making sure that 
investment in railway infrastructure is sustainable. These are: 
a)  the government (through the HLOS and SoFA, issued at five-year intervals), including high-level 
enhancement ring-fencing; 
b)  NR (through its active management of the network, subject to government and other funding, and 
regulatory determinations); and 
c)  the regulator (through its efficiency determinations, for a given level of quality and safety, on 
operations, maintenance, renewal, and enhancement costs of the railway). 
d)  Investment sustainability must therefore be ensured through the combination of government 
guarantees and funding, the infrastructure manager’s effectiveness and efficiency over time at 
delivering the outputs required by government policy and regulated by ORR, and ORR itself as it 
sets NR’s targets in terms of cost efficiency and asset management for a given level of quality and 
                                                      
9  The total amount of rail subsidies in the UK for main line services, including trains, is around £4.4bn (€5.3bn) per annum 
(2009), as reported by the UK Department for Transport. This is around 44% of the total amount paid by France in 2009, 
including local and regional subsidies. The British network is (mainline GB) roughly 55% the size of the French one. 
10  NR owns virtually all GB main line stations, with the exception of those serving HS1 and the Channel Tunnel (which are 
owned either by London and Continental Railways under concession to HS1 or by Eurotunnel, limited to the Tunnel 
terminals). It also manages a core of 18 mainline stations, including all London terminals, whereas smaller stations are – 
with a few exceptions – managed by franchised train operating companies. 
11  Sources: ORR and NR. 
12  These two documents are the UK version of the Programme/Framework Contract between government and industry as 
per EC Directives on the liberalisation of the EU railway sector (first, second, and third packages).  Gian Carlo Scarsi and Gregory Smith 
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safety. ORR does this by assessing NR, both in isolation and in comparison with other IMs (in the 
EU and beyond), through a series of benchmarking activities.  
The GB case study is summarised in the following Table. 
Table 1: Institutional arrangements in GB. 
Ownership of IM  CLG structure, formally classified as private but 
guaranteed by the state 
Access charges set by  Methodology  and  framework  by  the  regulator 
(ORR); actual pricing calculations by the IM 
Ownership  and  funding  of  high-speed  network  Separate through a distinct company (LCR) 
directly owned by government, with tradable 
concession
13 
Ring-fenced funding for different items of 
network expenditure (operations/ 
maintenance/renewals/enhancements) 
Some significant enhancements are ring-fenced in 
the HLOS, for instance the refurbishment of some 
big stations and some crucial projects like 
London’s “Crossrail” by-pass
14 
Private share capital in IM?  No
15 
Debt guaranteed by the state?  Yes, for a “financial indemnity” fee 
Who sponsors and specifies investment?  The government, as a “high-level” output (sort of 
framework agreement) 
Who plans and delivers investment?  NR
16 
Who  approves  investment?  ORR, subject to high-level government 
specifications 
Who funds investment?  Government,  NR through track access charges, 
and the financial market through NR-denominated 
debt under state guarantee 
Who is responsible for investment sustainability 
over time? 
Government, NR, and the regulator (ORR) 
                                                      
13  The concession (asset operations) is currently being put up for tender by the UK government. HS1 funding is mainly 
through per-train occupancy minute charges (pre-paid “use-it-or-lose-it” third-party access with currently no secondary 
market) paid by international open-access operators, and per-minute track access charges paid by domestic high-speed 
train services using the line between London and the Tunnel. There is no explicit (direct) government funding or network 
grant.   
14  The London by-pass is jointly sponsored by Transport for London and Network Rail. There was also a Transport 
Innovation Fund, set up by the previous UK government for special innovation projects (mainly enhancements), but there 
are indications that, following the recent public spending review (June 2010), this fund will either be scrapped or be 
profoundly modified in scope. 
15  However, some network investment has recently been undertaken in conjunction with non-infrastructure parties such as 
train operators (for instance, on the commuter branch in South-East England franchised to Chiltern Railways). DfT has 
recently issued (July 2010) a consultation on train operations’ franchise reform. The consultation covers options to ensure 
that future rail franchises deliver improved services for passengers, better value for taxpayer money, and create the right 
conditions for a sustainable rail industry. It includes specific options such as granting longer franchise periods, alternative 
risk-sharing arrangements, and incentives for private investment. It was published on 
http://www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/open/2010-28/ Note that train operators can be either publicly or privately owned. If 
the reform goes ahead, it might lead to more direct investment proposals from the TOCs, possibly in partnership with 
Network Rail. 
16  Up to 2002, when the (then) IM was taken over by NR, much of planning and delivery was sub-contracted. Since 2003, 
NR has brought back in much of maintenance and all investment planning. Investment delivery falls under NR’s 
responsibility but most of it is contracted out, both in terms of renewals and enhancements. Infrastructure maintenance is 
both planned and carried out internally. NR has around 33,000 full-time equivalent employees in total. Different approaches and responsibilities for investment sustainability in EU railway infrastructure: four case studies 
5 
3. France 
In France, the railway industry is controlled by the state. Infrastructure management, including high-
speed lines, is the responsibility of Réseau Ferré de France (RFF). RFF delegates the day to day 
maintenance of the network, and above all enhancements and renewals, to the historic incumbent 
Societé Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français (SNCF) in its capacity as “delegated IM”
17.  
RFF has been equipped by the French government with 1,100 full-time equivalent employees. 
Almost 50% of these are based in Paris, with the remaining 50% based across regional locations in 
France. The regional offices of RFF do not necessarily mirror historic SNCF rail regions, but are 
consistent with administrative French regions. RFF is the network asset owner for the whole of 
metropolitan France (including Corsica) and SNCF is currently the sole network asset concessionaire. 
RFF transfers to SNCF each year, on behalf of the government, a network management fixed fee of 
around €3bn.  
RFF oversees SNCF’s best (i.e., efficient) use of the network management fee, a role which the 
economic railway regulator (ARAF), created in 2010, might contribute to in future. RFF also uses 
engineering sub-contractors to carry out its IM functions, but the role of these companies relative to 
SNCF is negligible.  
3.1 The relationship between RFF, SNCF, and the regions 
At the moment, there is a relatively small technical team available to RFF to oversee the efficiency 
and effectiveness of SNCF’s management IM contract. This means that some of SNCF’s actions might 
not be fully observed, or properly monitored, by RFF because of a shortage of resources. Moreover, it 
is arguable that investment planning and delivery should remain with RFF, but monitoring and review 
should be transferred to the independent regulatory authority, although the government will probably 
retain approval powers. The regulatory authority, ARAF, will also be responsible
18 for high-speed 
network regulation and for international interconnections in conjunction with other regulators or 
commissions
19.  
The fixed annual fee paid by RFF to SNCF for overall network management is reported as an 
operating expenditure item by RFF. This means that it is not possible for RFF to separate this fee into 
operations, maintenance, renewals, and enhancements of the network.  
The subsidy paid by the French government to the rail industry as a whole amounts to around 
€12bn per annum
20. Network renewals are funded out of RFF’s own annual cash flow sourced from 
track access charges
21 (circa €1bn p.a.). Regional lines
22 (where the majority of running trains are 
                                                      
17  In June 2010, the European Commission took 13 countries, including France, to the European Court of Justice for not 
fully implementing the First European Transport Liberalisation Package (Directive 2001/14/EC). According to the 
Commission, France has still not clearly separated the management of railway infrastructure from train operations. 
18  In practice, from 2011. 
19  At the moment, the Channel Tunnel between France and England, run commercially under the name of Eurotunnel, is 
regulated as a long-term concession by an Inter-Governmental Commission (IGC). It is worth noting that, apart from 
safety and technical inter-operability which are under the remit of the Valenciennes-based European Railway Agency 
(ERA), the international coordination of interconnection investment in railway infrastructure, including capacity 
allocation and congestion management, cannot rely on a sound European base yet. In other network industries, 
international cooperation responsibilities are currently being transferred by the European Commission to new agencies 
(energy, electronic communications).  
20  Source: authors’ discussions with RFF. 
21  In France, stations are owned by SNCF, not by RFF. This situation has potentially powerful implications for third-party, 
open access train operators, for instance those new entrants in the long distance and/or high-speed markets willing to 
exploit the competition possibilities offered by the third EU railway liberalisation package (2010). Although SNCF is 
obliged to provide station access to third parties on a non-discriminatory basis, there is an evident conflict of interest with Gian Carlo Scarsi and Gregory Smith 
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those belonging to the SNCF division known as Transport Express Regional, TER), are directly 
subsidised by regions (circa €200m per annum), in different proportions depending on every region’s 
willingness to pay for, and propensity to support, local passenger railway traffic
23. Some of the 
subsidies are intended to pay for regional trains as opposed to lines, in which case SNCF will receive 
them directly.  
3.2 Funding of renewals and enhancements 
Network enhancements must be co-funded according to pre-defined quantitative principles by law: 
a)  up to 50% through bonds (RFF’s own debt
24); and 
b)  up to 50% through subsidies (from the state, the regions, and/or the EU in a very limited number 
of cases). 
Network renewals are defined as like-for-like asset replacements. Everything that is not like for like is 
classified as enhancements. All new high-speed line projects are, by definition, enhancements, 
including international links used by both incumbents and new entrants. 
The French case study is summarised in the following Table. 
Table 2: Institutional arrangements in France. 
Ownership of IM  Entirely owned by the state 
Access charges set by  RFF/SNCF, with a future role for the economic 
regulator (ARAF) 
Ownership  and  funding  of  high-speed  networks  RFF through network funding via grants, debt 
issues, and income from track access charges 
Ring-fenced funding for different items of 
network expenditure (operations/ 
maintenance/renewals/enhancements) 
Yes 
Private share capital in IM?  No 
Debt guaranteed by the state?  Indirectly, since RFF is entirely state-owned 
Who  sponsors  and  specifies  investment?  The government at a high level (Ministry of 
Transport) and RFF at a detailed level 
Who plans and delivers investment?  RFF plans investment and incumbent TOC SNCF 
delivers it as “delegated IM” 
Who  approves  investment?  RFF subject to its Programme Contract (a 
framework agreement) with the government; in 
(Contd.)                                                                   
special respect to the main TGV stations located along international corridors such as (for instance) those in Paris, Lille, 
Lyon, and Strasbourg. 
22  According to Les Echos (25 June 2010), the French government and SNCF have been negotiating a public service 
agreement for “territorial equality” rail lines (conventional lines that span more than one region, used by inter-regional, 
night, and special discount trains). Regions will not finance the lines directly. The government may establish an inter-
regional compensation scheme funded through a surcharge on all high-speed train tickets (SNCF and new entrants). As 
reported by Les Echos, the “territorial equality” lines have an annual turnover deficit of EUR 100m to 400m. There are 
both rolling stock and line maintenance backlogs on these lines. The public service agreement could last for two to five 
years and will also determine the future of rolling stock renovation. 
23  This gives rise to distinct levels of rail transport density and pricing by region. Interestingly enough, since individual 
regions are not bound by emissions targets constraints locally, it will eventually be up to the state as a whole to balance 
different regional attitudes to rail subsidy against France’s overall agreed emissions targets. This should be done by 
balancing the cost of local transport by different modes (rail, road, waterways) at a national level through (arguably) 
either a regional compensation fund or a nationally-led government policy on the relative pricing of non-rail local 
transport modes. 
24  Interest cost is split by duration (short and long term) to reflect the different time horizon of investment projects. There 
has also been a recent re-balancing between debt and network access charges (SNCF/RFF). RFF’s debt is largely 
determined by law because of the mandatory way in which railway capital expenditure must be financed. Different approaches and responsibilities for investment sustainability in EU railway infrastructure: four case studies 
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the future, the regulator (ARAF) subject to the 
Programme Contract 
Who  funds  investment?  Government, the regions (through RFF and 
SNCF; local lines only), RFF through track access 
charges, and RFF on the financial market through 
RFF-denominated bonds  
Who is responsible for investment sustainability 
over time? 
Government, RFF, SNCF under delegation, the 
regions, and – in the future – the regulator 
(ARAF) 
4. Germany 
In Germany, railway infrastructure is largely controlled by DB Netz
25 AG, which is part of the DB 
Group. Stations, energy traction, and other ancillary aspects of infrastructure are dealt with by separate 
companies of the DB (Deutsche Bahn AG) Group. Formally, there is an open access regime operating 
on all services. Regional rail transport is subcontracted, similarly to France, at a federal state level 
(Land) and there are separate DB companies dealing with regional train services (such as DB Regio). 
The regional DB company is also in charge of some regional passengers franchises overseas, for 
instance in England (Chiltern Railways, Tyne and Wear Metro in the Newcastle/Sunderland region) 
and is also active in passenger open access operations. DB has also a dominant position
26 in the 
German (as well as other European) freight market through its subsidiary DB Schenker. DB Schenker 
is also involved in road haulage and logistics. 
The DB Group is run as a limited company with shareholders (Aktiengesellschaft). However, all 
shares are currently owned by the Federal Government. The infrastructure aspects of DB, i.e. the 
activities of DB Netz AG, are subject to federal economic regulation by the Bundesnetzagentur 
(BNetzA), Germany’s multi-sector network regulator. The BNetzA does not directly monitor 
investment and does not, at the moment, benchmark DB Netz’s cost efficiency levels. However, it has 
powers in the setting of track (and station) access charges contributing to DB Netz’s annual regulated 
revenue requirement. 
There are a large number of train operators in Germany, especially regional, local, suburban, and 
heritage railways. However, the long distance passenger market is virtually a DB monopoly and the 
levels of investment in regional grids are mainly agreed upon at Land level by passenger transport 
authorities (some of which can be municipal, especially in large conurbations) which, in a similar way 
to France, contract their infrastructure and service requirements directly with DB Regio and other 
transport operators. 
However, the way in which regional rail transport investment is dealt with in Germany bears a 
fundamental difference from what is observed in France
27. The federal states deal with two separate 
entities when agreeing the required level and funding of infrastructure investment and train services. 
                                                      
25  We understand that the group has recently renamed itself DB Netze (plural) to reflect a multiplicity of activities along 
different lines, including the electricity network. 
26  The European Commission, when justifying its Infringement Decision towards 22 out of 27 Member States for not 
abiding by the First Liberalisation Package (see 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1031&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLang
uage=en), claimed that, for France, Germany, and a number of other Member States there were “insufficient incentives 
for the IM to reduce costs and levels of access charges”, partly due to a lack of regulatory oversight, suggesting that the 
Bundesnetzagentur should be given more powers to oversee DB Netz AG.   
27  In France, RFF (separately from SNCF) contracts with regions from a relatively centralised perspective (although it does 
have regional offices), and there is a separation between RFF (both Paris and regional) and SNCF/TER (regional train 
operations).  Gian Carlo Scarsi and Gregory Smith 
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DB Regio formally coordinates with its mother company DB Group (and DB Netz) on infrastructure 
issues as well.  
DB Netz for network infrastructure (track, signalling, civil engineering, ancillary structures), DB 
Station & Service for stations including retail, and DB Energie for traction electricity all have access 
to overall infrastructure federal funding of €2.5bn per annum. Out of this total grant, €0.25bn each 
year is reserved (2009-2014) for DB Station/Service. DB Energie currently self-generates around 80% 
of DB Netz traction electricity requirements. Electricity for traction is resold by DB Netz to the train 
operating companies (including DB itself) through a system of transfer prices. However, electricity 
purchasing and resale is currently unregulated by BNetzA (which otherwise deals with both rail and 
energy regulation) because of a legal loophole (which is currently being closed) at a federal level. In 
addition to the annual federal grant, DB Netz receives €3.9bn from train operators
28 in mainline track 
access charges. This amount is the minimum annual recoverable input from government and users of 
the network, although in theory extra contributions are allowed. The annual funding plus track access 
charges is intended to cover maintenance, renewals, and stations, but there is the possibility of ad-hoc 
contributions for network enhancements
29. 
The quinquennial 2009-2014 Framework Contract between the Federal Government and Deutsche 
Bahn AG is the first of its kind (as per European Directives) in Germany. Therefore, similarly to 
France, there is no possibility of a backward comparison with previous programme contracts. Also 
similarly to France, the contract also covers high-speed lines because these are part of DB Netz AG. 
Local services are subsidised, on top of network grants to DB Netz and ancillary companies, via 
additional subsidies separately provided by federal entities
30 (Bundesländer, through public transport 
authorities). There are open access tenders for regional integrated transport (generally covering local 
and light rail, tramways, and local coaches/buses under an integrated fare system). DB has so far 
tendered for the majority of local transport contracts and therefore receives an extra subsidy for 
regional operations (mainly directed to DB Regio
31) in addition to the federal subsidies provided to 
DB Netz and its ancillary companies. 
BNetzA does not police local tenders. Tender fairness should be checked ex post by the Federal 
Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt). Although the mechanisms underlying local transport services in 
Germany are, as said, technically different from France, the observed results in terms of investment, 
end-user fares, and quality of service are similar: 
a)  in both countries, the level of investment and service depends on the region’s (or individual Land 
in Germany) willingness to pay for it; 
b)  in both countries, there are sometimes evident regional differences in investment, end-user prices, 
and quality of service; and 
c)  in both countries, regional rail services are sometimes dependent on the effectiveness of inter-
modal alternatives (where available) and on the asset management strategies of the infrastructure 
                                                      
28  The turnover of DB Netz AG (source: DB Annual Report, 2009) is about €4.1bn, around 94 per cent of which is made up 
of access charges. The remainder is (mostly) direct government funding. However, one must keep in mind that access 
charges mainly come from other parts of the publicly-owned DB group, so the difference between access charges and 
direct federal funding in the German case is mainly an issue of accounting definition. 
29  DB Netz stated in its 2008 annual report that 75 per cent of all investment relates to the existing network (down to 70 per 
cent in 2009). However, there is no confirmed public data about the fraction directly funded by DB Netz (through charges 
or debt) as opposed to direct federal funding. 
30  DB Regio gets around 61% (source: BNetzA Annual Report, 2009) of funding for regional line rail services, including 
train operations, from regional passenger transport authorities, which in turn fund these subsidies through a variable mix 
of local taxes and direct contributions from the Federal Government.  
31  A significant fraction of the regional service tenders has been awarded, in the last round of tendering, by the Laender to 
either DB Regio or other subsidiaries of Deutsche Bahn. Different approaches and responsibilities for investment sustainability in EU railway infrastructure: four case studies 
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manager, for instance in terms of “cascading” materials and assets from higher-speed 
services/lines to lower-speed ones
32. 
It is also worth noting that the BNetzA does not set network access charges itself. The IM sets charges, 
which are then reviewed ex post by the regulator. The regulator has the right to make objections. This, 
together with the fact that the economic regulator is physically separate from the safety one 
(Eisenbahnbundesamt), gives rise to a potential issue in terms of investment sustainability in the 
longer term as cost and safety/performance issues might eventually present a binding trade-off (with 
either cost spiralling up or safety/network quality deteriorating). Also, since track access charges must 
take into account and discount to the present the existence of long-run cost trade-offs and lumpy 
capital investment, the fact that DB Netz currently sets charges, with the BNetzA checking and 
approving them - albeit consistent with what happens in utility sectors - might potentially present 
some efficiency and sustainability issues. This is because DB Netz is a “natural” monopoly in 
Germany, and is not currently exposed to any benchmarking or comparative cost efficiency analysis 
by BNetzA
33. Since the regulator cannot verify the efficiency of the regulated company’s costs, it 
should at least, in the interest of investment sustainability, have a greater say in the determination of 
revenue requirements through track access charges
34.  
The funding of investment in renewals and enhancements is, for a fraction approximating 21.5% in 
2008 (source: DB Netz/DB Annual Report, 2008), directly provided by DB Netz through its 100% 
state-controlled mother company. The state does not directly guarantee Deutsche Bahn’s debt as there 
is no need to do so, since the company is fully owned by government. Because of the way in which 
state and regional funding was modified in 2008-2009, DB Netz’s gearing ratio
35 as a whole has 
recently been calculated at 28.7% (source: DB Netz Annual Report, 2008). There is no distinction 
between renewals and enhancements with respect to DB funding (including debt). The state makes a 
formal distinction, but it is eventually up to DB Netz to separate funds for enhancements and renewals.  
The German case study is summarised in the following Table. 
Table 3: Institutional arrangements in Germany. 
Ownership of IM  Entirely owned by the state 
Access charges set by  DB Netz, reviewed and approved by the regulator 
Ownership  and  funding  of  high-speed  networks  DB Netz through network funding via grants, 
debt, and income from track access charges 
Ring-fenced funding for different items of 
network expenditure (operations/ 
maintenance/renewals/enhancements) 
Yes, but only limited to renewals of existing 
network as opposed to enhancements (network 
changes) 
Private share capital in IM?  No, but the infrastructure manager is organised as 
a private-sector holding group 
Debt guaranteed by the state?  Only indirectly, since DB is entirely state-owned 
at the moment 
Who  sponsors  and  specifies  investment?  The government at a higher level (Federal 
Ministry of Transport) and DB Netz AG 
                                                      
32  The BNetzA is currently not allowed to challenge the efficiency of DB Netz’s costs based on, for istance, international 
benchmarking analysis.  
33  Anecdotal evidence gathered by ORR in Great Britain and by its advisers during a European benchmarking study 
suggested that both RFF in France and DB Netz in Germany sometimes “cascade” materials (for instance, rail and 
ballast) from higher to lower speed lines. 
34  For instance, in the UK, the regulator is legally allowed to challenge the IM’s cost efficiency and to exert first-hand 
control over the methodology and actual calculation of track access charges. 
35  This refers to interest-bearing debt only. DB Netz liabilities in 2008 were worth €12.6bn on total assets of €22.1bn. 
Source: DB Netz Annual Report, 2008. Gian Carlo Scarsi and Gregory Smith 
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Who  plans  and  delivers  investment?  DB Netz plans investment as a function of the 
national Framework Contract with the Federal 
Government. Independent regional 
railways/suburban ones do the same limited to 
their territorial agreements with the regional 
passenger transport associations and (sometimes) 
with municipalities in wider urban areas featuring 
integrated local transport  
Who approves investment?  The Ministry, through the Framework Contract  
Who funds investment?  The Federal Government, some municipalities -- 
limited to integrated urban transport involving 
urban railway lines, DB Netz (through track 
access charges and own debt, not directly 
underwritten by the Federal Government) 
Who is responsible for investment sustainability 
over time? 
The Federal Government, DB Netz in concert 
with the BNetzA (throught the mechanism of 
setting and approving access charges), and 
municipal authorities limited to integrated local 
transport in metropolitan areas  
5. The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Transport, Public Works, and Water is responsible for policy in the 
rail sector. It is also responsible for funding ProRail, the IM, on top of track access charges, and for 
issuing concessions for passenger transport and for infrastructure management. 
ProRail reports back to the Ministry on its infrastructure management activities and is mainly 
responsible for granting track access and for timetabling on the mainline network, which is kept 
separate from high speed lines. The main passenger train operating company in the Netherlands is 
owned by the old incumbent, NS. However, there is a healthy level of open-access competition in 
freight services because the country is a traditional transit node for transport in general (including 
seaports). There is also a separate chamber of the Dutch Competition Authority (NMa) that is 
specifically charged with the regulation of rail network access. 
ProRail is responsible for maintenance, management, renewal, and enhancement of the traditional 
infrastructure network. The high speed network (Amsterdam to Northern Belgium line) is currently 
separate. It is both owned and managed by a privately-controlled infrastructure company, originally 
set up as a public/private partnership
36.  
Investment sustainability in the Netherlands is spurred by a number of laws. Both ProRail and NS 
have to abide by primary legislation as regards: 
a)  sustainable quality; and  
b)  the way in which some of the infrastructure management activities are undertaken (for instance, 
outsourcing and working practices). 
For this reason, ProRail and NS, both of which are linked to the government by a concession 
agreement, are obliged to demonstrate to the Ministry that their investment strategies, both in 
infrastructure and train operations, meet the minimum standards set in the concession sustainably over 
time. Therefore, the ultimate responsibility for investment sustainability in the Netherlands firmly 
remains with the Ministry. The Ministry has chosen to delegate the monitoring of the concession, 
                                                      
36 These arrangements have been formalised under a 25-year concession tender.  ProRail might theoretically step back in 
when the tender is re-issued. Different approaches and responsibilities for investment sustainability in EU railway infrastructure: four case studies 
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including input measurement, to the Competition Authority (NMa), which acts de facto as the 
economic regulator of ProRail. 
The Dutch government has recently shifted from an “input” to an “output” view of infrastructure 
regulation, meaning that ProRail is now judged on a mixture of cost (i.e. input) efficiency and output 
effectiveness in terms of service quality (punctuality, density, and congestion minimisation targets) as 
well as network safety. This mix of output and input regulation is well known from the British case. 
Shifting from input to output regulation does not mean that the Ministry will cease to be the ultimate 
guarantor of infrastructure investment. It, however, does mean that ProRail will gradually be less 
constrained in the way it decides to pursue investment sustainability and effectiveness. Because of this 
move and other rail policy signals sent by the Ministry, it is apparent that the role of the economic 
regulator will have to become more important in the future, especially with respect to incentive 
regulation and target setting.  
It might be argued as a result that the current transport and infrastructure management plans (for 
NS and ProRail, respectively), currently agreed upon by the Ministry and the interested parties, will 
have to be monitored by the regulator. In this respect, the Netherlands is currently facing the same 
challenges as France (and Belgium) in terms of empowering the independent rail regulator and making 
the infrastructure managers perceive that the economic regulator is a distinct entity from the Ministry. 
All in all, the Dutch approach to infrastructure investment is therefore relatively centralised and 
Ministry-based. However, there are local concessions for regional transport which are issued and 
administered by local transport authorities through a tender process, in quite a similar way to what is 
observed in Germany
37. For this reason, it might be argued that the approach adopted in the 
Netherlands towards infrastructure investment and funding is a mix of the French (Ministerial 
steering), British (gradual shift towards output-based regulation), and German (separation between 
long distance and regional concessions) approaches. The regulator
38 is only dealing, for the time being, 
with track access charges and national capacity allocation.  
Infrastructure funding is provided by the state to ProRail for main line services. It is directly 
provided, partly on behalf of the state and partly through local finances, by regional transport 
authorities for local lines. The concession agreement between the Ministry and ProRail (expiring in 
2015, renewable) is the Dutch equivalent to the French and German Programme/Framework Contracts 
(dictated by EU transport policies on railway sector liberalisation), which in turn – for they specify 
inputs and outputs – are the equivalent to the British output/input “contract” (HLOS/SoFA) between 
the government and the railway sector as a whole (including train operators). 
The concession agreement with ProRail obliges the latter to produce a yearly infrastructure 
management plan (with set output-related performance standards) in exchange for the yearly 
government subsidy (network grant) paid to ProRail by the government for maintenance, renewals, 
enhancements, and structures. Enhancements are ring-fenced in the structural investment plan, so that 
the government can assess them (individual network improvement/expansion projects) on a case by 
case basis. To complement the government subsidy, ProRail receives network access charges from 
train operators, which only tend to cover the short run marginal cost of the infrastructure. The 
government therefore remains, through the network grant, the ultimate and sole guarantor of network 
investment sustainability. 
Regional services are now subject to tender offers (like in Germany) with a relative degree of 
competition to NS (whose passenger train operations, differently from the British case, have not been 
dismantled before setting the franchise auctions in place) from both domestic and international 
                                                      
37  In the Netherlands, a number of privately owned local railways are relatively free to set the level of their services, 
timetabling, etc., subject to national network quality and safety standards.  
38  This is the transport regulator (the Transport Chamber). There is also a separate Railway Safety Agency. Gian Carlo Scarsi and Gregory Smith 
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entrants. In this respect (train operations’ franchising), the Dutch policy can be viewed as a hybrid 
between the radical British approach and the more traditional German one.  
Without prejudice to safety (separately regulated), the Transport Chamber within NMa oversees 
fair access to the railway network, determines capacity allocation in concert with ProRail (with a 
special focus on the punctuality performance v traffic density trade-off, for a given level of network 
capacity), and reviews ProRail’s network access charges. However, the Chamber is not at the moment 
engaging in any active cost efficiency benchmarking of ProRail (including investment cost and capital 
expenditure plans, which are formally overseen by the Ministry directly). Recent informal contacts 
with the Chamber point towards a possibly more active NMa role in cost efficiency analysis in the 
future.  
The Dutch case study is summarised in the following Table. 
Table 4: Institutional arrangements in the Netherlands. 
Ownership of IM  Entirely owned by the state (traditional lines); the 
high-speed IM (concessionaire for 25 years) is a 
mixed-ownership company at the moment 
Access charges set by  ProRail; reviewed and approved by the regulator 
Ownership and funding of high-speed networks  Separate  ownership  and  government  funding 
through grants, debt, and income from track 
access charges 
Ring-fenced funding for different items of 
network expenditure (operations/ 
maintenance/renewals/enhancements) 
Yes, but only limited to large individual 
enhancement projects (network changes)  
Private share capital in IM?  No, but the infrastructure manager is organised as 
a private-sector holding group 
Debt guaranteed by the state?  Only  indirectly, since ProRail is entirely state-
owned at the moment 
Who  sponsors  and  specifies  investment?  The government at a higher level (Ministry of 
Transport, Public Works, and Water), the regional 
passenger transport associations at a lower level, 
and ProRail at a detailed level (nationally and 
regionally); high-speed investment is separate 
Who plans and delivers investment?  ProRail must plan infrastructure investment on a 
compulsory basis to meet the requirements of the 
national concession agreement with the 
government. This concession agreement also 
covers regional lines, but does not cover some 
privately owned secondary (local) networks, 
which are subject to separate (less stringent) 
quality and safety requirements and otherwise 
plan their investments freely. There are some 
professional, rail-dedicated engineering concerns 
(such as Strukton) who deal with maintenance and 
renewals on a contractual basis. Overall planning 
responsibilities remain with ProRail 
Who  approves  investment?  The Ministry, through the national concession 
agreement 
Who  funds  investment?  The government, the regional (sometimes 
municipal/provincial) Passenger Transport 
Authorities, and residually ProRail through 
partially cost-recovering track access charges and 
own bonds. High-speed incremental investment is 
currently funded by the private sector. 
Who is responsible for investment sustainability  The government, through the national concession Different approaches and responsibilities for investment sustainability in EU railway infrastructure: four case studies 
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over  time?  agreements with ProRail and NS; limited to 
franchised regional train services, the regions 
through their own franchise agreements with train 
operators; limited to privately owned local 
railways, the owners of these railways (subject to 
quality and safety standards); long-run 
responsibilities for high-speed investment 
sustainability are currently unclear, given the 25-
year concession horizon. 
6. Policy considerations 
The four case studies examined so far have shown different models of rail infrastructure management 
and regulation.  
In Great Britain (GB), the government sets a high-level output specification and the IM is regulated 
by incentives and outputs to deliver the level of service expected by the government (given safety) for 
the funds available. There is an independent, combined economic and safety regulator which is 
perceived to be different from the “Ministry of Transport” (DfT in England/Wales and Transport 
Scotland in Scotland). The IM (Network Rail) is therefore left relatively free to determine the way in 
which its infrastructure plans are to be sustainable in the long run, subject to the overseeing powers of 
the regulator. The IM is a “company limited by guarantee”, formally in the private sector but with debt 
underwritten by the British government in exchange for a financial indemnity fee. Therefore, although 
funding is ultimately determined by government, the IM can theoretically choose to diversify its debt 
away from government support
39. In GB, high-speed services are distinctly structured and regulated 
(including investment) as separate companies and there is a concession agreement on the line to the 
Channel Tunnel, which will lead to private system operation of the existing (government-owned) high-
speed line and stations as soon as the high-speed system concession is put up for public tender in the 
second half of 2010. The government is also planning to develop a fully domestic high-speed line, but 
the stated lead time horizon is still relatively long. In both cases, investment sustainability is left to the 
government, although the economic and safety regulator has been given formal powers to oversee it 
(as it does with conventional lines) since October 2009. 
In France, the government determines the way in which investment has to be carried out 
sustainably, but regions play an important role in making sure that local track sections (and train 
operations) stay alive. In this respect, and counter-intuitively, the French approach to investment 
sustainability is less centralised than the British one
40. The IM (RFF) is theoretically free to make the 
most appropriate trade-offs between different items of infrastructure expenditure (for instance, 
between maintenance and renewals), but is constrained by law about the way in which it must fund 
enhancements. It is also currently affected by some lack of monitoring power over the “delegated” IM 
(SNCF), especially in terms of transparency over the apportionment of the yearly €3bn “network 
management fee” that RFF transfers to SNCF for its network management services. The regional way 
in which RFF is structured aids the regionalisation of rail infrastructure policy as desired by the 
government, but does not necessarily facilitate regional interaction between RFF and SNCF. The 
French rail regulator (ARAF) was created in early 2010 as a separate entity from the Ministry of 
Transport. It will be responsible for access charging and conditions, but there have been no clear 
                                                      
39  This has not happened so far, because the IM can access better credit conditions if its debt is supported by a state 
guarantee. Also, because of the financial and economic downturn observed since late 2007, it is quite unlikely that 
“unsupported” debt will be issued by the IM any time soon. 
40  With the obvious exception of Scotland as a distinct constituent nation, and subject to London-Edinburgh devolution 
measures. Gian Carlo Scarsi and Gregory Smith 
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signals so far that its responsibilities will also be extended to the assessment of efficient and 
sustainable network investment.  
In Germany, the government controls funding through a Framework Contract with the IM (DB 
Netz/e AG). Regional governments (the Federal Laender) retain an important role in planning 
investment (as well as train services) at a sub-national level, as regions do in France. The main 
difference between the German and French regional approaches is that, in Germany, there is a specific 
subsidiary of the Deutsche Bahn group dealing with regional issues, whereas in France the regions 
negotiate train services and infrastructure investments with the delegated IM through RFF, although 
both the delegated IM and RFF do have regional operations. The German government pays the IM 
around €2.5bn/year according to the current Framework Contract (2009-2014) and oversees 
investment. Like in France, the German economic regulator only deals with access charging at the 
moment, without challenging the IM on infrastructure cost efficiency or on the effectiveness of 
sustainable asset management. Primary legislation is needed to empower the economic regulator in 
this respect. At the moment, ex post regulation (including investment issues), when not tackled 
directly by the Ministry, must be dealt with by the Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt). 
In the Netherlands, there is a hybrid approach to investment sustainability, with an interplay of 
elements of all three preceding cases combined. The concession agreement between government and 
the IM (ProRail) is similar to the French and German approaches. The franchising of some passenger 
services, with some infrastructure maintenance responsibilities, bears some resemblance to the British 
train operation franchising case (with a limited role played in infrastructure by train operators). The 
regionalisation of some infrastructure management is once again a mixture of the French and German 
cases. Finally, the existence of a regulator which does not really oversee infrastructure investment (for 
the time being), but simply deals with track access charging and capacity allocation, is similar to the 
German case. The most original practical aspect observed in the Netherlands is perhaps the strong 
presence of professional engineering companies dealing with maintenance and renewals on an 
independent (contractual) basis, but under the strict planning guidance of ProRail. Another interesting 
aspect of the Dutch approach is that the high-speed operator (for just one line, like in England) has 
been set up as a public-private partnership by government tender and is currently in the private sector 
(its shareholders include Siemens and HSBC Infrastructure), with funding from track access charges. 
To conclude, some policy considerations on the sustainability of network infrastructure investment 
from observed international practice are offered below: 
a)  given funding requirements, the government remains the ultimate customer of railway services in 
each of the countries considered, with the only possible exception of high-speed services; 
therefore, it is reasonable for it to remain in control of investment specification and sponsorship; 
b)  given the possibility of socially beneficial cross subsidies between high-speed networks and 
traditional ones, it is not surprising that different countries look at the separation of high-speed 
lines from classic ones in different ways. This is mainly a value judgement. Although, from an 
economic perspective, separation is a superior alternative (cf. HS1 in Great Britain), especially for 
those countries with a substantial domestic high speed network (such as France), horizontal 
integration (coupled with the regionalisation of lower-speed lines) might provide more security in 
terms of sustainability, assuming the cross subsidy will not lead to inefficiencies and/or to 
excessive regional differences in the quantity and quality of local rail services;  
c)  it is relatively surprising that only one country out of four has a fully independent economic 
regulator overseeing investment plans and investigating cost efficiency. Irrespective of industry 
design (vertical/horizontal separation, structure of subsidies, etc.) and also in line with the three 
EU railway liberalisation packages, investment sustainability (as well as certainty and 
contestability) is normally facilitated by the existence of an independent and non-captured 
regulator which is perceived to be distinct from the funding Ministry. This “type” of regulator Different approaches and responsibilities for investment sustainability in EU railway infrastructure: four case studies 
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(present in GB) has just been created in France, and ought to be granted more powers
41 in 
Germany and the Netherlands; 
d)  there are only two cases out of four where some aspects of investment (typically, network 
renewals/enhancements) are dealt with separately – France and Germany. In Britain and the 
Netherlands, the IM is set relatively free to make internal trade-offs between expenditure items 
(for instance, renewals and enhancements). Whether the government should more or less over-
specify the investment mix in the first place eventually depends on the level of professional trust 
placed in the IM and the regulator. In a country with an overseeing regulator, one would expect a 
less interventionist government. Assuming this is the first best (i.e., a non-micromanaging 
government), regulators should then be given powers to oversee IM capital expenditure. This is 
what happens in Britain, but not in the Netherlands. However, where the regulator is not in this 
position, one would typically expect a more interventionist government (or a “government-
regulator”), which is currently the case in France and Germany; 
e)  in all cases examined, IM debt is guaranteed, either directly or indirectly, by the state. In one of 
the cases examined (Britain), the IM can theoretically issue debt that is not supported by the state, 
but this has never happened so far. In all other cases, although there is no formal state guarantee, 
the debt issued by the IM is perceived to be akin to state debt because the IM, albeit organised as a 
private limited company with shares, is currently 100% state-owned. State guarantees clearly 
enhance investment sustainability (as long as the state does not go bankrupt!) and reduce interest 
costs. However, as technology develops (high speed lines) and sovereign states face tougher 
financial positions, it might be argued that -- perhaps in the not too distant future -- some rail 
investment will be more sustainable if undertaken and financed privately. This interesting 
development, which must be tested in reality, might favour the complete ownership unbundling 
[but see points (a) and (b) above] and privatisation of high speed facilities and services (including 
strategic bottlenecks such as international interconnections like the Channel Tunnel or the future 
Alpine High Speed Tunnels); and 
f)  regionalisation, as observed in France, Germany, and the Netherlands, is useful in ensuring that 
responsibility for investment is brought closer to the demand for services. However, in order to 
avoid that IMs simply “off-load” unprofitable low-speed lines to regional governments, in the 
interest of long-run sustainability it is important that national governments set up compensation 
(“federalist”) schemes to make sure that the level of quality and quantity of service in each region 
does not fall short of minimum acceptable standards -- even in those regions that, for economic or 
other reasons, choose or are constrained to accept lower standards of service
42. 
                                                      
41  A fully empowered regulator should have authority over access charges, cost efficiency analysis, access to detailed data, 
and competition policy issues. 
42  However, this would become an issue if the country were subject to territorial or fiscal devolution. Arguably for this 
reason, the regional rail transport model has not been chosen so far in the UK, where devolution would limit inter-
regional compensation schemes or fund transfers between the four constituent nations. Indeed, in one of those -- not 
examined here (Northern Ireland) -- rail transport is dealt with in a completely separate way (as with other network 
industries). Also because of the limited size of the local market, Northern Ireland’s railways are still vertically and 
horizontally integrated. Gian Carlo Scarsi and Gregory Smith 
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